The Complex Dynamics of Sunni Politics in Iraq : หน้า 13/52

nizations with local roots. They understand the importance and advantages of a decentralized system. They appear to have very little respect for the central government or even for Sunni politicians in parliament and the cabinet. Local groups have also started organizing into larger coalitions, which suggests they might develop an interest in national-level politics. At the same time, they are also coming into conflict with each other. In a rapidly changing situation, it is difficult to reach overall conclusions about Sunni goals. It is even difficult to predict the future course of tribal militias, whether they will turn against the government to protect their autonomy, or conversely, will try to become part of, and possibly dominate, the Iraqi military, supporting the dream of renewed Sunni power in a centralized Iraq. U.S. tactics also have been in constant flux ever since the occupation. Washington improvised on the political level during the first year of occupation and then finally devised a democratic transition process that put Iraq through a forced march of constitution-writing, elections, and institution-building that left no time for discussion and reconciliation. By December 2005 the formal process was completed, but it was soon obvious that the success of the formal steps did not translate into a viable political outcome. The parliament elected in December 2005 did not succeed in forming a government until May 2006, and that government proved far too divided to be effective, with each party concentrating on turning the ministries it controlled into political fiefdoms. Dissatisfied with the outcome of the constitution-writing process, the United States also devised a new political strategy. This was to coax, cajole, and even coerce Iraqi politicians to amend the constitution to increase the power of the central government and thus the acceptability of the system to the Sunna and to negotiate a new oil law and other crucial legislation. The process continued desultorily through early 2007. As public opinion in the United States turned increasingly against the war, the administration tried to make accomplishment of those tasks into benchmarks the Iraqi government had to meet within a few months in order for U.S. support to continue—without such agreement, the argument went, the U.S. military effort would be wasted. By the fall of 2007, it had become clear that the Iraqis could not meet the benchmarks. At the same time, the Sunni tribal militias the United States was arming to fight al-Qaeda started having some successes locally. As a result, the Bush administration tacked in a different direction again, downplaying the importance of the benchmarks it had previously embraced and announcing that the best way to put Iraq back together politically was not to pursue an elusive reconciliation among political factions at the center, but to build from the bottom up, capitalizing on local successes. This vision of bottom-up reconstruction of the country has never been spelled out clearly. In fact, U.S. policy toward finding a political solution in Iraq has become increasingly contradictory. The administration is still adamantly opposed to a partition of Iraq, even a “soft partition” into autonomous regions similar to Kurdistan. It is still building up the Iraqi military and trying to bolster the power of the central government. At the same time it is encouraging, training, and arming a plethora of tribal Sunni militias—variously called “concerned citizens’ groups” or “Awakening councils”—to fight al-Qaeda and provide security at the local level, without a plan for how all these groups can be reintegrated into a cohesive state.