Iran's Strategic Influence in Post-Saddam Iraq : หน้า 15/52

which ended conclusively with a UN-mandated cease-fire and eventually a return to the status quo, made it very clear that neither country could break the balance of power. By removing Saddam Hussein, the United States did just that. Ahmadinejad's election and the increase in the price of oil, influenced in part by the war in Iraq, have allowed Iran to take advantage of the opportunity offered by Saddam's downfall. Tehran has fortified its alliance with Damascus and stepped up support for Hizbollah and Hanas. It has amplified its belligerent statements about Israel. In the view of some Arab governments in the region, Iran is building a "Shi'ci crescent," that is an alliance with Shi'i groups and organizations in Iraq, the Gulf, and the Levant. Furthermore, as part of what it sees as an existential and ideological war with the United States, Iran is even seeking alliances with faraway countries such as Venezuela and offering support to organizations such as the Taliban with whom it has little in common apart from enmity toward the United States. The third reality is that Iran now has great influence in Iraq through its relation with various Shi'i organizations. This influence predates the U.S. invasion of Iraq, has been magnified since. It started growing during the 1980s and increased in the 1990s, when many Iraqi Shi'i clerics sought refuge across the border when Saddam Hussein increased repression of the Shi'a who had tried to rebel, with U.S. encouragement but finally without actual support, after the first Gulf War. While secular opponents of the Iraqi regime fled to the West, Shi'i clerics flocked to the more familiar atmosphere of Iran, where many had studied. Iran welcomed them with open arms, both for ideological reasons and out of state interests. It was natural for a theocratic regime to offer hospitality to persecuted clerics, but more than religion was involved. Iran also helped organize political movements and arm their militias. The main Shi'i parties active in Iraq today organized and trained their militias in Iran, particularly in the 1990s. Broadly speaking, Tehran is now encouraging a Shi'i-dominated, Iran-friendly government and keeping the United States preoccupied and at bay, but it also wants to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and avoid complete instability. This has entailed a complex three-pronged strategy: 1) encouraging electoral democracy as a means of producing a majority, i.e., Shi'i rule; 2) promoting a degree of chaos without leading to a complete breakdown of Iraq; and 3) investing in a wide array of diverse, sometimes competing Iraqi factions. As a result, Iran is so positioned that it can protect its interests under a variety of political scenarios. It has provided support to all important Shi'i factions and militias, and there is some evidence that it may have extended some support even to Sunni groups. In a way, the influence of Iran is ensured both under a democratic scenario—demography ensures that Shi'i parties will always control the majority of seats in parliament in fair elections—or if militias prevail. Because Iran can remain influential in a weak Iraq under a variety of scenarios, it has credibility when it argues that it does not want the country to break down or sink into complete chaos. Paradoxically, the outcomes Iran does not want—the breakup of Iraq or total chaos, are the same ones the United States rejects. The fourth reality is that, short of an armed intervention, the United States does not have strong instruments to force the Iranian regime to change its policies. Iran has at times decided CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE