The New Middle East: Democracy vs. Stability : หน้า 28/52

22 THE NEW MIDDLE EAST few, limited in scope, carried out only when allowed by incumbent regimes, and dropped quickly when governments objected. After September 11, President Bush openly repudiated this policy. “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe—because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty,” he proclaimed in a speech at the National Endowment for Democracy in 2003. And he began his second term by simply declaring the long-perceived tension between security and democracy dead: “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.” The soaring presidential rhetoric about a policy based on both values and interests yielded far less than the revolution it promised. The results amounted to more robust rhetoric, funding increases for conventional democracy promotion programs through the Middle East Partnership Initiative, aggressive use of democratic ideology against enemies, and occasional gentle pressure on some friends. But when elections in the region brought unpleasant (but largely predictable) results, the freedom agenda receded. Elections in Iraq and Lebanon deepened sectarian divisions; in Egypt and Palestine they allowed Islamists to show the depth of their public support and organizational ability, and they won a clear victory in Palestine. As the U.S. position in the region dangerously deteriorated, autocratic but reliable regimes suddenly seemed more palatable, certainly in comparison to their Islamist challengers. The change was reflected in a shift in the U.S. language that transformed friendlier regimes earlier defined as “autocratic” into “moderates.” By 2007, the Bush administration seemed to have reverted precisely to the policy of purchasing stability at the price of liberty it had so recently denounced. The reversal of policy should not be dismissed as a sign of the fickleness of a particular administration. Rather, it goes to the heart of an underlying structural problem, namely that while “America’s vital interests and deepest beliefs” may be one in the long run, they clash in the short run, particularly in a part of the world where U.S. interests are considerable and the political situation very unstable. This clash between short- and long-term interests is nothing new. The United States has long pursued two core interests—access to Arab petroleum and protecting the state of Israel—that are contradictory. What the Bush administration failed to do was figure out how to reconcile a newly salient long-term interest (the promotion of freedom and democracy) with its other interests and short-term expediency. Domestic political realities in most Middle East and North African countries also undermined the U.S. commitment to promoting democracy. Most Arab regimes did not openly resist the new American discourse on democratization—most, in fact, claimed that democracy was their long-term goal and to show their goodwill even introduced some modest reforms that did not limit their power. But many regimes also resented the United States’ newly critical attitude toward them. This was true in particular of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, long-time friends of the United States that felt unjustly targeted, even if direct pressure on them was in the end quite limited. Among the Arab allies of the United States, Egypt was subjected to the most pressure. Bush singled it out (though in polite terms) as a country in need of reform, and Secretary of State CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE