The Complex Relationship Between the U.S. and Iran : หน้า 16/52

to be cooperative on its own terms and for its own interests, but this does not mean that the United States is in a strong position to push Iran to comply with its requests, particularly at present. The U.S. military is bogged down in Iraq; oil prices are near their historical high and likely to remain high because of increasing demand from energy-hungry China and India. Sanctions are not likely to be effective under such circumstances, particularly since it is clear that they will never be respected by all countries. The military option could be extremely dangerous for the United States, entailing the threat of retaliation against U.S. interests and even friendly regimes in the Gulf area, as well as politically costly for the administration and the Republican Party. The fifth reality is somewhat less dark. Iran has an extremely complicated relation with the United States. Hostile since the 1979 revolution, Iran has become even more antagonistic at present as a result of Washington’s opposition to Iranian nuclear ambitions and U.S. financial support for “democracy promotion” efforts, and the extraordinarily aggressive style of President Ahmadinejad. In the past, however, even theocratic Iran has been open at times to making deals with the United States. It worked with the United States in the 1980s on the deal that became known as the Iran-contra scandal: Iran was allowed to purchase covertly U.S. military equipment during the war with Iraq, with the payment used by the United States to finance the Nicaraguan contras—the militias the Reagan administration was arming to fight the Sandinista regime despite an explicit congressional veto. More recently, Iran played a seminal role in helping to form the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan in cooperation with the United States, only to see itself denounced as part of the axis of evil shortly afterward. And in the spring of 2003, around the time Baghdad was captured by U.S. forces in less than three weeks, the Iranian government sent out quiet feelers to the Bush administration expressing an interest in addressing their mutual points of contention. In the proposal, Iran suggested that, in exchange for a U.S. commitment to recognize the Islamic Republic and its security interests, it would cooperate on the nuclear issue and Iraq. Iran also stated its willingness to support a two-state solution for Palestine, cease material support to Palestinian opposition groups, and facilitate Hizbollah’s transformation into a “mere political organization within Lebanon” in the framework of an overall agreement. For a variety of reasons, the United States chose not to pursue or even acknowledge the overture. In other words, Iran has shown that it is willing to put state interests ahead of ideology when this is expedient. When doing so does not suit its purposes, however, Iran can show extreme hostility toward the United States, its leaders prone to making vitriolic remarks bound to destroy confidence and incense public opinion in the United States. The Syria–Lebanon Cluster The dominant view in Washington of the relation between Syria and Lebanon is a Manichaean one: it is depicted as a struggle between the forces of democracy, represented by the March 14 coalition and the embattled Siniora government, and the forces of tyranny, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE