Political Dynamics in Iraq Post-2007 : หน้า 12/52

the United States during 2007 has helped reduce violence, there has not been any corresponding political progress. Different Iraqi political figures and forces have competing and often changing visions for Iraq, and even when the vision is clear, there often remain discrepancies between vision and actions on the ground. The only parties to the Iraq war with a clear, consistent vision that has not changed over time and concrete policies that correspond to the vision are the Kurds. From the beginning of the war, indeed from the end of the first Gulf War, the Kurds have aimed to develop their own autonomous region. Popular sentiment in Kurdistan favors independence, but this is a path leaders have so far firmly rejected (or postponed) as too dangerous. The Kurds have acted consistently to realize their goal. They have supported the adoption of a constitution for Iraq that puts minimal powers in the hands of the central government and much in the hands of regions and provinces. They have maintained the separate identity and command structure of the Kurdish militia, although it is nominally part of the national army. They have created a regional government and parliament that enact laws and govern the province. They sign investment contracts directly with international corporations, including in the oil sector, bypassing Iraq's central government. The Kurds' goal is clear and their actions consistent with the goal. The goals of others in Iraq are much more fluid. Because they are the most numerous group, with the most members of parliament and control over the office of the prime minister, Shi'a have a vested interest in preserving the power of the central government. Yet, the different Shi’i factions have highly conflicting goals. The Da’wa Party of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, not surprisingly, is committed to bolstering the authority of the central government. Though also part of the government, the Islamic Supreme Council led by Abdel al-Aziz al-Hakim (formerly the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) shares the Kurdish view of an Iraq where power is concentrated at the regional level. It favors the unification of the nine predominantly Shi’i provinces into one single region. Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical cleric who heads the largest but also least disciplined and cohesive Shi’i militia, talks of a unified Iraq but at the same time has been contesting the authority of the central government and imposing his own control wherever he can. The smaller Fadilah party, based predominantly in Basra, is building up its fiefdom in that city. Sunni views, once fairly clear, are also becoming more diversified and complex. Sunna felt marginalized by the disbanding of the military after the demise of the Saddam regime, the de-Baathification program, and elections that put them, with their 20 percent share of the population, at a disadvantage. So they boycotted elections, only to discover that this made things worse by giving them an even smaller voice in the writing of the constitution and in the parliament. The absence of strong Sunni leadership and the divisions among various factions compounded the weakness of Sunni representation. Paradoxically, Sunna initially reacted by advocating the rebuilding of a strong, centralized Iraqi state, despite the fact that they were unlikely to play an important role in such a state. More recently, the position of Sunna has begun to evolve, but in ways that are still unclear. The new tribal militias the United States helped organize to fight against al-Qaeda are orga- CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE