Challenges of Democracy Promotion in the Middle East : หน้า 44/52

38 THE NEW MIDDLE EAST must be clearly defined; in the Middle East, the concept of democracy promotion has fluctuated from aggressive rhetoric of regime overthrow at one extreme to small, little noticed, probably not very effective but innocuous educational, women’s rights, or cultural exchange programs at the other end. This has created a great deal of confusion. Inevitably, attention in the Middle East has focused mostly on the threatening tone, the rhetorical statements, and the glaring discrepancy between rhetoric and actions. The idea of democracy promotion needs to be clearly differentiated from that of regime overthrow, not only because the conflation of the two ideas is counterproductive, but because the overthrow of even the most tyrannical regime does not necessarily lead to democracy, as Iraq shows. Separating regime overthrow from democracy promotion is not just a question of language, but also of tools used in promoting more open political regimes. Sanctions, for example, should have no part in a program of democracy promotion. Second, the United States must make sure that it understands the probable consequences of the policies it launches and is willing to accept them. This will require a more honest and realistic assessment of the situation that prevails in each country. Political openings bring to the fore whatever political forces exist in a country, not simply a general desire of citizens to be free. Unless those forces are understood, country by country and case by case, the United States will not be able to act consistently and avoid the backtracking that has undermined its credibility in recent years. Finally, a new policy of democracy promotion must focus on the most likely candidates for reform, the semi-authoritarian states with varying degrees of pluralist politics, such as Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen. In such countries, U.S. efforts need to focus on clearly defined goals, tailored to needs and conditions of each country. Efforts should not be wrapped up in ambitious-sounding but ultimately empty regional programs, such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. As for countries that do not yet have either the state institutions to support a democratic system or independent, organized political forces, the United States needs to recognize its fundamental lack of knowledge about how a process of political reform could unfold there. In such countries, efforts should concentrate on nudging regimes toward reforms that could be introduced from the top, such as an improvement in the human rights situation, more press freedom, and more freedom to operate for civil society organizations. At the same time, the United States should be careful not to misrepresent and praise marginal top-down changes as democratization, as the Bush administration has often done when heaping praise on countries like Bahrain and Oman. Long-term efforts to promote political change must be pursued quietly. No matter how carefully future policies are shaped, conflicts will inevitably arise between short-term security interests and long-term democratization. It would help if U.S. policy makers were franker—and more sophisticated—about the problem. Arab governments and reform advocates already know that American values and American interests do not always coincide. Pretending that this is not the case serves no purpose except to undermine credibility when the inevitable discrepancies between high principles and political necessity become glaring. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE