Iran and Sunni Relations in the Middle East : หน้า 34/52
The New Middle East : หน้า 34/52 Analysis of Iran’s role in Shi’i and Sunni interactions within the Middle East, highlighting diplomatic efforts and sectarian tensions.
The complexities of Iran's relationship with Sunni states underscore the ongoing challenges in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Iran seeks to be a leader in the region, supporting not only Shiite factions but also Sunni groups like Hamas. However, this creates a delicate balance, as heightened Shi'i sentiment could lead to a Sunni coalition against Iran, potentially backed by the U.S. Concurrently, Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, are cautious to avoid direct confrontation, engaging in diplomacy with Iran and seeking to mediate tensions within Palestinian factions. High-profile meetings between Iranian and Saudi officials have emerged, especially following conflicts involving groups like Hizbollah. Meanwhile, Egypt has pursued improved ties with both Iran and Syria, indicating a broader effort for stability among Arab nations. Mitigating sectarian polarization remains crucial for U.S. policy in the region.
หัวข้อประเด็น
-Iran's ambitions in the Middle East -Sunni and Shi'i relations -Diplomatic efforts by Saudi Arabia -Role of Hamas in Palestinian politics -Egypt's involvement in Middle Eastern diplomacy -Impact of U.S. policy on sectarianism
ข้อความต้นฉบับในหน้า
Although Iran is a center around which Shi’i resentment could coalesce, two factors reduce the likelihood that the Tehran regime will encourage such a development. One is that Iran aspires to be the champion of the entire Muslim Middle East, not just the limited world of Shiism. Its support for Sunni groups, such as Hamas in Palestine, is a testament to this. The second factor is that an aggressive Iranian attempt to develop a grand regional Shi’i alliance would prompt the formation of an alliance of Sunni states backed by the United States. Nevertheless, the deepening of sectarian divisions and the fact that Shi’i grievances have remained largely unaddressed represent an additional source of instability in the Middle East that U.S. policy needs to lessen, not enhance.
For their part, the Sunni Arab regimes, particularly in the Gulf, are also seeking to avoid a confrontation with Iran. They have shunned U.S. attempts to bring them into an anti-Iranian alliance and launched their own diplomatic efforts to deal with Iran. The Saudis have been at the center of these diplomatic efforts. When Hizbollah escalated its confrontation with the Lebanese government in late 2006 after the summer war with Israel, several meetings took place between Iranian and Saudi representatives purportedly to calm the situation. In early 2007, Ali Larijani, then head of the Iranian National Security Council, met several times with Prince Bandar bin Sultan, his Saudi counterpart, to discuss a variety of concerns. In March 2007, Saudi King Abdullah and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met directly for the first time. This first contact was followed by an invitation to Ahmadinejad from the king to visit Mecca for the pilgrimage at the end of 2007. While pursuing contacts with Iran, the Saudis also undertook efforts to mend relations between Fatah and Hamas in Palestine, leading to the signing of the Mecca agreement in February 2007 and the formation of a Palestinian government of national unity. After the agreement failed, leading to a serious split in the Palestinian ranks, with Fatah in control of the West Bank and Hamas of Gaza, the Saudis did not give up on reconciliation, but resumed their efforts, this time with the support of the Egyptian government. In early December 2007, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, Khalid Mish’al, visited Riyadh for talks. At the same time, the Saudi and Egyptian governments sent a signal of displeasure to the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority by completely bypassing it in arranging for several hundred residents of Gaza to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.
More recently, the Egyptian government has also become more involved in these new diplomatic efforts, seeking better relations with both Iran and Syria. In late December, Ali Larijani, by then adviser to Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, visited Cairo to meet with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit, leading to speculation that Egypt and Iran would soon restore diplomatic relations, and with the Arab League Secretary, Amr Musa. In late 2007 Saudi Arabia and Egypt also undertook efforts to restore good relations with Syria, strained because of Damascus’s ties to Iran and Syria’s support for Hizbollah in its confrontation with the Lebanese government. The Arab League even announced that the next Arab summit meeting will take place in Damascus, in March 2008.
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