Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Challenges and Implications : หน้า 25/52
The New Middle East : หน้า 25/52 Exploration of Israel's nuclear capabilities, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the risks of proliferation in the Middle East.
This text discusses the complex dynamics of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, particularly focusing on Israel's alleged nuclear capabilities and Iran's nuclear program. It highlights the risks associated with potential nuclear weapons development by states and non-state actors in the region. The U.S. concerns about Iran, following the exposure of its nuclear activities and the stalled negotiations since 2005, are also detailed. The geopolitical implications of expanding nuclear technologies in the region are presented, emphasizing the fine line between energy needs and military ambitions.
หัวข้อประเด็น
-Nuclear Proliferation Risks -Iran's Nuclear Program -Israel's Nuclear Capabilities -Diplomatic Negotiation Challenges -Impacts on U.S. Foreign Policy -Regional Security Dynamics
ข้อความต้นฉบับในหน้า
tember 2007 Israeli bombing of what Israelis claim was a suspicious facility in Syria. But the issue of Israel’s nuclear weapons is perennially off the table. The United States, along with most other countries in the world, has been concerned about the development of a nuclear capability by unfriendly countries and rogue regimes, because proliferation poses many risks: a) nuclear weapons or nuclear material for manufacturing dirty bombs could be used by a government or passed on to terrorist organizations; b) an Iran with nuclear weapons capability could be more emboldened to subvert other states and encourage Hamas and Islamic Jihad to act more aggressively toward Israel; c) proliferation in the Gulf would dangerously complicate the operation of U.S. forces in the region and weaken friendly states’ confidence in U.S. protection. Nuclear proliferation is likely to become more widespread in the region, however. Many countries in the Middle East and North Africa have announced their intention to master the technology of nuclear power plants, citing the need for new, noncarbon sources of energy for their growing populations and economies. In itself, this is not worrisome. The long-term problem is that stable and friendly countries can become less so, and new rogue regimes can arise in countries that have developed a degree of nuclear know-how.
The reality of the Iranian nuclear program is that the United States and European countries have so far been unable to curb Iran’s ambitions to enrich uranium and master the nuclear fuel cycle, rather than rely solely on third countries to provide Iran with fuel for nuclear power plants. The capacity to enrich uranium would be an important step toward Iranian capability to build nuclear weapons down the road. Negotiations have been at an impasse since 2005.
Many factors led to this impasse. First, Tehran managed to conceal the scope of its nuclear activities until August 2002, when the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization (MKO), a radical Iranian opposition group, presented satellite imagery of large-scale uranium conversion and enrichment facilities as well as heavy-water reactors. At that point Tehran, to alley concerns about its intentions, agreed to suspend all sensitive nuclear activities and to admit inspectors from the IAEA.
Second, once the existence of the program was revealed, the United States took an unpromising position, demanding that Iran dismantle it without offering anything in return. Keen to show the United States that Iranian nuclear ambitions could be curb without the use of force, Britain, France, and Germany (the so-called EU3) embarked on a process of negotiations with Iran. While Washington eventually accepted these talks, it was openly skeptical about the possibility of positive results and advocated referring Iran immediately to the UN Security Council. European officials engaged in the EU3 dialogue from the fall of 2003 to the spring of 2005 frequently complained about Washington’s lack of support for their diplomatic initiatives. This, they argued, effectively precluded any chance of a negotiated settlement, given that only Washington, not Europe, could offer the dividends (such as security assurances) that Iran sought.
In addition, when Iran, as already mentioned, expressed interest in resolving various points of contention with the United States in 2003, Washington did not respond. Furthermore, the president consistently disparaged Iran’s leadership and encouraged the Iranian people to