Engaging Iran: A Focus on Iraq and Diplomatic Strategies : หน้า 38/52

While an engagement approach should eventually be comprehensive, the United States should focus initially on Iraq, because the United States and Iran share an interest in retaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and containing a bloody civil war. A U.S.–Iranian dialogue about Iraq should deal with the central issue of the nature and presence of an ongoing U.S. presence in Iraq on one side and Iran’s policies and activities in support of various Iraqi factions on the other. Eventually, if enough confidence is build, the discussion should extend to the nuclear issue, but in the present atmosphere of confrontation there is no common ground between Washington and Tehran on that problem. Iran’s fractious leadership has formed a consensus to resist outside pressure to relinquish its claimed right to enrich uranium. Such consensus is relatively unusual in Tehran and various factions would find it risky to deviate from this position. Iranian leaders judge that the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and others cannot impose costs great enough to compel Iran to indefinitely suspend, let alone abandon, enrichment. Therefore Tehran will be highly unlikely to accept U.S. demands in a negotiation on the nuclear issue, unless Washington (with perhaps Russia or another country acting as broker) were to accept a formula whereby Iran could continue some level of enrichment activity under intensive international monitoring. As long as the United States and the UN Security Council do not change their demands, or Iran does not feel much weaker, this issue holds little promise of diplomatic progress. Concentrating on the broader security relationship in Iraq and the Gulf is therefore more promising. Here, a mix of confidence-building diplomacy and deterrence can be pursued, involving Iran’s neighbors as well as outside powers. Engaging Iran in no way implies appeasement, nor does it preclude efforts to warn other countries or of contain Iranian influence and policies that are problematic. It must be made clear to Tehran that a hard-line approach will only increase the country’s political isolation and economic malaise. UN Security Council resolutions and international political and financial pressure on their own will not bring about a diplomatic resolution with Tehran; nonetheless, in the short term, they are necessary tools to show that a belligerent approach will not reap rewards. At the same time, the United States needs to keep in mind that Iran will never agree to any arrangement in which it is expected to publicly retreat or admit defeat, nor can it be forced to compromise through pressure alone. Besides the issue of saving face, Iran’s political elite—chiefly Ayatollah Khamenei— believe that compromise as a result of pressure projects weakness and will only encourage the United States to demand more. The results of a successful engagement policy—beginning a difficult process of reintegrating Iran into the global economy and improving Iranian ties with the United States—will provide more fertile ground for political reform in Tehran and dilute the control of hard-liners, who thrive in isolation. For this reason, a small but powerful clique with entrenched economic and political interests in the status quo will do everything in their power to torpedo attempts at reconciliation. By eschewing dialogue, Washington plays into the hands of these Iranian hard-liners. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE