Political Dynamics and Sectarian Tensions in the Middle East : หน้า 31/52

retrenchment into a more ideological posture by a movement that has sought, but has so far been denied, a legitimate political role. The adoption and subsequent abandonment of the freedom agenda brought into the open the extent to which the political situation in most Arab countries makes quick transitions to democracy in the region impossible. Even if the United States managed to reconcile its long- and short-term goals sufficiently to pursue a consistent policy concerning democracy, its efforts would still be frustrated in the short run by incumbent regimes that have no interest in jeopardizing their own power. So-called reformers in the ruling establishments only want economic reform and administrative modernization, not civil and political liberties and broad political participation. Secular opposition parties and civil society organizations, which the United States sees as natural allies, are extraordinarily weak in most countries. Islamist movemen ts that have chosen to participate in their countries’ political life in a legitimate fashion are better organized and more able to develop popular constituencies, but Washington in most cases sees them as threats, rather than as potential allies in democracy promotion. Pro moting democracy in these circumstances would require a much longer time frame, a less Manichean view of the world, and more subtle diplomacy than those chosen by the Bush administration. **Sectarian Conflict** One of the unanticipated and troublesome consequences of U.S. intervention in Iraq has been the increase in sectarian tensions not only in that country but in the entire region. Coupled with the Iranian assertiveness encouraged by the collapse of the Iraqi state, the new saliency of Sunni–Shi’i divisions has led to growing concern in some Arab countries and in the United States about the rise of Shi’i power in the Middle East. Alarmist statements about the rise of Shi’i power were first made by King Abdullah of Jordan in December 2004. Addressing an American audience, he used the term “Shi’i Crescent” to describe an alleged Iranian ambition to change the regional order by creating an alliance of Shi’i regimes and movements in the predominantly Sunni Middle East.7 A few weeks later the same sentiment was echoed by President Mubarak of Egypt, who accused the Shi’i citizens of Iraq and the Gulf of being more loyal to Iran than to their nation-states. But the formation of a Shi’i crescent is a far-fetched idea. Although there is a great deal of discontent among Shi’a, particularly in the Gulf countries and, of course, Lebanon, as already discussed, such discontent is not likely to translate into a grand regional alliance dominated by Iran. The first reality is that Shi’i activism and the politicization of Shi’i identity are on the rise. One reason for this is obviously the rise of the theocratic regime in Iran, which stresses the country’s Islamic (though not sectarian) identity; by contrast, the shah emphasized the legacy of the Persian empire. Another is the rise of a government in Iraq where Shi’a dominate along with the Kurds as junior partners, and Sunna have little representation or influence. A third is the choice made by most Shi’i to stress their religious identity; secular Shi’i politicians have