The Complexity of Syrian-Lebanese Relations : หน้า 17/52

represented by the March 8 forces led by Hizbollah and the Syrian regime, seen as proxies for Iran and its policy of regional domination. The Syria–Lebanon cluster, in this view, is at the center of two broader struggles, one between democracy and tyranny and the other between the United States and Iran. Some parts of this representation contain elements of truth. The Syrian regime does have a strong relationship with Iran and also with Hizbollah, the main Lebanese Shi’i party. Others are overstated: while the March 14 coalition is struggling against what appears to be a Syrian-backed assassination campaign against its members and is resisting a return of full Syrian control over Lebanon, it also is an agglomeration of sectarian politicians and even warlords out to secure their own political and sectarian interests in the Lebanese political scrum. And while the Cedar Revolution was an important nationalist reaction against Syrian domination, it was not strictly a “democratic upheaval,” and it failed to overcome sectarian divisions, which have since only gotten deeper. The election law and election alliances that the March 14 coalition adopted to win the 2005 parliamentary elections shattered the illusion that it was committed to political reform and good government. Meanwhile, Hizbollah stuck to its alliance with Syria, despite apparent Syrian culpability in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, and tried to block the formation of an international tribunal to try the case. Former army general Michel Aoun, a main voice against Syria and Hizbollah while in exile in France, quickly formed an alliance with them upon his return to Lebanon in pursuit of his goal of being elected president. In general, the reality in both Lebanon and Syria is infinitely more complex than the Bush administration’s narrative presents. SYRIA. The first reality of Syria is a domestic situation that has changed very little over time, despite a transition of power from Hafez al-Assad to his son Bashar in 2000. Syria is ruled by an authoritarian, Baathist regime, which has now shed much of its Arab nationalist and socialist ideology without becoming any more liberal. It is a regime controlled by the Alawite minority and determined to perpetuate its power at all costs. Bashar briefly cultivated an image of himself as more liberal than his father, indeed a reformer, but the so-called Damascus Spring that followed his rise to power was short-lived. To the extent that a reform effort is still under way, it is strictly limited to trying to improve administrative efficiency and economic performance. The second reality, which has also changed very little despite U.S. efforts, is that Syria is determined to play a central role in Lebanon, and in all probability it will continue to find ways to do so, no matter how the United States tries to block it. The attempt to sideline Syria completely led to stalemate in Lebanon. The third, much more complex and, as in the case of Iran, less dark reality is that the foreign policy of Syria on issues other than Lebanon is far from immutable. Syria is out to protect its interests, not to adhere to a dogma. This makes it a difficult country to handle, but also provides some opportunities. Syrian foreign policy since the 1970s has gone through two distinct periods. In the first, from the 1970s until the 1990s, Syria pursued a highly pragmatic policy. Syria essentially distrusted the United States and opposed U.S. Middle East policies,