The Dynamics of Secular and Islamist Parties in Arab Politics : หน้า 30/52

The weakness of the secular opposition is not entirely of its own making. Arab authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes—many of which have been ruling their societies in the name of secular ideologies—have long employed repressive measures against liberal and leftist parties. Furthermore, Arab societies, always conservative in their social and religious attitudes, have become increasingly so over the last decades, limiting the space available for the articulation of secular views in politics. But secular parties have also brought the crisis down upon themselves by neglecting the basic task of organizing. Secular opposition groups have not focused on the constituency-building imperative required to participate successfully in political systems that are election-based, although not truly democratic. As a result, popular constituencies that had once been secular, such as industrial workers in Egypt or urban intellectuals in Morocco, have drifted toward Islamist movements or are siding with incumbent regimes for fear of the Islamists. Almost by default, Islamist parties have emerged as the core of the opposition in most Arab countries. Paradoxically, the possibility of democratic reform now depends to a great extent on Islamist parties and movements. The question often posed is whether they only accept the democratic process as a means of gaining power, in which case democracy would not survive, or whether, once in power, they would continue to uphold democratic values and respect the democratic process. There are, of course, radical and violent Islamist organizations that accept neither, but they do not participate in elections. Major Islamist parties now fully accept the idea that participation in elections does not go against Islamic principles and have chosen to compete in national and municipal elections as well as in the elections for the leadership of professional syndicates, a considerable political force in the Arab world. In a few countries, they have even joined the ruling coalition as junior partners; in Palestine, Hamas formed the government after the 2006 elections. A related question, whether Islamist parties that accept democracy as an instrument also accept its values, is much more difficult to answer. It is clear, however, that not all Islamist parties are alike. Some maintain an armed wing—all Shi’i parties in Iraq, Hizbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine. While these parties have not used force in the election process, their armed wings give them a clout that goes beyond what they gained in elections. At the other extreme, there are Islamist parties that have gone such a long way in renouncing violence and accepting pluralism that it would be difficult for them to turn back. In Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain there are “participation-comes-first” Islamist parties that are well integrated into the political system. These parties look at the nation-state rather than the Islamic umma as their area of operations, accept the principle of universal citizenship, and have largely turned from ideological diabtribes to the formulation of pragmatic programs. Finally, there are Islamic parties or movements in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen that are torn between ideology and pragmatism, in part because they are not accepted by the ruling establishment as legitimate. These movements are thus caught between “normal” politics and its accompanying need to develop a practical political program, on the one hand, and confrontation, which risks pushing them back toward more dogmatic positions, on the other. The political program published by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in September 2007 shows CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE