The Complex Dynamics of Lebanese Politics and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict : หน้า 20/52

port they enjoyed, gave names to the rival groupings: the March14 anti-Syrian forces and the March 8 pro-Syrian forces. The March 14 demonstrations, which in the U.S. narrative became the Cedar Revolution, marked, in effect, the rise of an anti-Syrian coalition encouraged by the United States and France. Inevitably, Syria responded by rallying its remaining allies in the country, which included Hizbollah, the Baath and Syrian Social Nationalist parties, and a portion of the Christian community. The elections held in the early summer only hardened the split. Held on the basis of an old Syrian-devised electoral law that gerrymandered electoral districts, the elections stirred up sectarian tensions, alienated large sections of the population, and created a parliamentary majority whose legitimacy could be questioned. Furthermore, the building of a governing coalition became difficult after a leading political figure in the Christian community, Michel Aoun, left the anti-Syrian alliance and joined Hizbollah in the opposition, taking a large portion of the Christian community with him. As had happened many times before, attempts at unity and independence in Lebanon were doomed by internal rivalries and poor leadership. The situation was made worse by the 2006 summer war. Far from destroying Hizbollah, as the United States and Israel envisaged, the war had the opposite effect: it strengthened Hizbollah and further weakened the Lebanese government. Emerging triumphant from what it described as a “divine victory,” Hizbollah immediately sought to turn its success in depriving Israel of a battlefield victory into political advantage. By the end of the year, the Shi’i ministers in the coalition government had resigned, paralyzing both parliament and government. The stalemate was confirmed in November 2007, when the term in office of President Lahoud expired without the governing majority’s being able to elect a president of its choosing, and with the parliament unable to agree on a compromise candidate acceptable to anti- and pro-Syrian forces alike. In conclusion, the new realities in both Syria and Lebanon continue to present the Bush administration with a major challenge. By confronting Syria in Lebanon, the United States has weakened its influence but not eliminated it. It has not altered the underlying reality of confessional politics in Lebanon, nor the fact that, as long as the country is so divided, major domestic players actively seek outside support and intervention, undermining the country’s sovereignty. The attempt to impose new realities on Lebanon–Syria has garnered some results, but it has not brought about a sustainable and stable solution. Lebanon is more complex than the narrative of the Cedar Revolution portrays, nor is Syria a defeated player. The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict Over the past two decades, a strong international consensus has gradually emerged supporting a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Many of the details of what that solution would look like have been spelled out and are understood by leaders on both sides as well as most international actors. This emerging consensus explains the oft-repeated statement that the solution to the conflict is known. But such a claim, while an accurate descrip-