Shi’a Discontent and Regional Dynamics in the Middle East : หน้า 32/52

failed to attract a substantial following. Finally, the growing importance of Hizbollah in Lebanon is probably another factor. Hizbollah has become not only a domestic player capable of paralyzing the government, but has also become a regional player by successfully standing up to Israel in the summer of 2006 and thus gaining, for a time, a heroic reputation. The second reality, however, is that Shi’a are a majority only in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, where they represent 70 percent of the population; they are also the single largest sect in Lebanon, although not the majority. Precise figures are a matter of dispute, but it is clear that in the vast majority of Arab and Islamic countries the percentage of Shi’a in the population is quite small. This suggests that focusing on a “Shi’i crescent” would not be a successful strategy for Iran. The third reality is that there is a great deal of discontent among Shi’a in many Arab countries, because they are faced with deep-seated institutional discrimination and tend to have a lower standard of living. Discrimination is particularly severe in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain, the Sunni al-Khalifa ruling family has consistently viewed Shi’a as a potential threat to its rule. Shi’a hold fewer than 20 percent of the high-ranking posts in the Bahraini government and are often turned down when they seek to join the military and security services. Their influence in elections has been limited by electoral gerrymandering and vote rigging. Since Shi’a do not have power, the government gives little attention to basic services in their neighborhoods and villages. Allegedly, they are not allowed to own property in certain areas considered to be “Sunni.” The situation is getting worse, because the government is trying to change the country’s demographic makeup. According to several reports that have become public in the past few years—the most controversial of which is the “Bandar Report”—the al-Khalifa family has been aggressively naturalizing Sunni Arabs and other Sunni Muslims working in Bahrain. Discrimination in Saudi Arabia is also strong and dissatisfaction high, as even some members of the royal family have admitted. But discrimination is difficult to suppress, because it is rooted in religious doctrine. The powerful Wahhabi religious establishment considers Shi’i Islam a heresy, bans public celebration of Shi’i holidays, and limits construction of Shi’i mosques. Religious discrimination is accompanied by social marginalization. Shi’a are greatly underrepresented in state institutions, especially the military and security agencies, and in the public service sector in general. And the predominantly Shi’i parts of the eastern province are underserved in terms of infrastructure and other facilities. However, there are some signs that the Saudi government is beginning to take steps to redress the situation. Shi’i clerics have been invited to national dialogue meetings, organized under the auspices of the Saudi monarch to curb the spread of militant ideologies, and there have also been regular meetings between leaders of the Shi’i community and the Saudi king. Human rights abuses against Shi’i citizens are also on the decline, and on a number of occasions Saudi authorities have ordered the deletion of anti-Shi’i content from school textbooks. Despite these modest improvements, tolerance of discriminatory practices against Shi’a is still evident in the country’s administrative and religious institutions. _________________________________________________ CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE