The Complex Relationship Between Syria and the United States : หน้า 18/52
The New Middle East : หน้า 18/52 An analysis of Syria's diplomatic relations with the U.S., its alliances, and regional influence since the early 2000s.
The text explores the evolving relationship between Syria and the United States, highlighting key moments such as the leadership transition from Hafez al-Assad to Bashar al-Assad, the impact of the Iraq War, and Syria's strategic alliances with Iran and its role in Lebanon. The U.S. shifted its policy towards Syria, moving from acceptance to confrontation due to Syria's anti-U.S. stance and support for militant groups. The narrative illustrates how Syria's actions, including its refusal to curb the transit of fighters to Iraq, have strained relations further, leading to legislative actions such as the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.
หัวข้อประเด็น
-Syria's foreign policy -Syria-U.S. relations -Hafez al-Assad -Bashar al-Assad -Iraq War impact -Syrian presence in Lebanon -U.S. sanctions and legislation
ข้อความต้นฉบับในหน้า
but set aside its criticism when this was in its interest. It was never in agreement with the United States and sought other allies, but never became so antagonistic as to provoke a strong American response. Syria maintained close ties with the Soviet Union and later with revolutionary Iran, thus burnishing its independent and radical credentials.
A new phase started with the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 and the rise to power of his politically less astute and experienced son Bashar. This transition in Syria coincided with a change on the U.S. side, namely the replacement of the formulation of policy toward Syria in old Middle East hands, willing to accept Syria as a troublesome but in the end fairly reliable player, with a more ideological new guard. The latter looked at Syria's opposition to U.S. power in the region, its alliance with Iran, its continued occupation of Lebanon, and its support for Hizbollah and militant Palestinian groups, and decided not to cut the Syrian regime any slack. The eruption of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000 and the election of Ariel Sharon to the Israeli premiership five months later made things worse by doom- ing the peace process in which Syria had been involved and thus eliminating the need for the United States to cooperate with the regime in Damascus.
As a result, Syria and the United States got locked into a confrontation over Iraq and Lebanon. Although it condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11 against the United States and promptly shared with Washington intelligence information on al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist networks it had been monitoring, Syria drew a line at the U.S. occupation of Iraq, believing it would destabilize the region, alter the regional balance of power irrevocably, and pose a direct threat to Syria and its ally Iran. As a result, Syria did nothing to curb the transit of fighters seeking to enter Iraq to join the insurgency and often carry out terrorist suicide attacks. It did nothing to curb the transit of weapons. And it strengthened its relations with Iran.
While Syria's role in the transit of people and weapons to Iraq irked the Bush administration, Washington decided to draw the line instead at Syria's presence in Lebanon. Syrian troops first moved into that country in 1976—Israel and the United States accepted Syria's presence in return for an explicit commitment not to cross into southern Lebanon. In 1990, the United States allowed the extension of Syria's presence to the entire country, because it wanted Syria's support in the war to expel Iraq from Kuwait and because Syria appeared to be the only player capable of bringing the Lebanese civil war to an end. This American approval of Syrian occupation and management of Lebanon prevailed from 1990 to 2003.
Syria's opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq changed the equation, prompting the U.S. Congress to enact the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act in December 2003. The Act called on Syria to “halt support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, stop its development of weapons of mass destruction, cease its illegal importation of Iraqi oil and its illegal shipments of weapons and other military items to Iraq,” and allowed the president to impose selective sanctions on the country if the Syrian government did not comply.
Despite the inauspicious state of U.S.–Syrian relations, Syria's continuing interference in Lebanese domestic politics, and its tendency to play a spoiler role in the region, there has