Challenges in U.S. Policy Toward Palestinian Elections : หน้า 23/52

Palestinian legislative elections to proceed credibly — but then led to an immediate American effort to overturn the result through any possible means. The Bush administration’s short attention span for matters involving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict extended even to the domestic American arena. The administration, much like some of its predecessors, often seemed a mere spectator as Congress sought to codify the harshest version of current policy into standing legislation. This laissez-faire attitude toward congressional action has now created a new reality in which aid to Palestinian institutions has become difficult, and any attempt to follow a path based on Palestinian national unity is bound to immediately run into legal restrictions. Any incoming U.S. president will find the way obstructed not simply by his or her predecessors’ policy commitments but also by legislation, which is sometimes quite draconian, with only limited waiver provisions. The result is that an administration publicly committed to a two-state solution may have presided over its demise; and a president avowedly committed to democracy has opposed from the very outset the first honestly elected government Palestine ever had, because the winner of the election, Hamas, is considered a terrorist organization by the United States. This has led to the collapse of a flawed but real democratic experiment. Hamas gave conflicting signals about its ability to evolve beyond its extreme positions, and it is highly unclear whether it would have done so sufficiently to allow for any meaningful diplomatic process. The most promising development—the formation of a national unity government and the willingness of Hamas to allow Abu Mazin to negotiate—was treated as a setback by the United States and actively undermined. The result has left Palestinians caught between three authorities: an undemocratic technocratic cabinet (led by Salam Fayyad, whose party gained a minuscule share in the 2006 vote); Fatah, a deeply divided and disorganized party, which Palestinians rejected in 2005 as a corrupt and ineffective organization; and a radicalized Hamas, which has now dug itself into power in Gaza illegally after winning a legal election in all Palestinian territories. The Bush administration inherited from its predecessor a difficult situation in the Israeli–Palestinian arena, but it may be bequeathing an impossible one to its successor. Not only are there few attractive diplomatic options, but the building blocks of any diplomatic effort have disintegrated. The Palestinian leadership is split. There are two rival governments, one of which rejects political negotiations with Israel. Palestinian institutions are highly politicized, deeply divided, often incompetent, and frequently near collapse. The Israeli leadership is weak and unable (and perhaps unwilling) to capitalize on the collapse of the vision of greater Israel that blocked any negotiated solution for two generations. The problem is not simply at the political level — both societies show signs of growing despair, exhaustion, and disillusionment in a manner that makes bold leadership almost unimaginable. Surrounding Arab states—whose involvement would be critical to supporting a renewed diplomatic process—are themselves also divided and disillusioned. Arab governments briefly succeeded in 2002 in articulating a vision for a diplomatic solution, but they have been unable to mount any concerted strategy to pursue that vision. The Bush administration’s success in gathering representatives from these states in Annapolis should Carnegie Endowment for International Peace