The Quest for Peace: The Two-State Solution in the Israel-Palestine Conflict : หน้า 40/52

Israel and Palestine U.S. core interests in the region include peace between Israelis and Palestinians, which would have as a corollary peace between Israel and all Arab countries. The only solution at present that can lead to peace while preserving the existence of the state of Israel and protecting Palestinian rights is the two-state solution. But it will not be easy to bring the two-state solution back from the dead. Its benefits are obvious. Both Israel’s security and its identity will be better protected, a portion of Palestinian national goals will be minimally met, the threat of wider war in the region will decrease, and U.S. diplomatic and security strategies will be easier to pursue. But the payoff of such a solution should not be oversold—it will lead not to a historic reconciliation among peoples or the full integration of Israel into the region but to a very cold peace, like the one that exists between Israel and Egypt—a manageably cantankerous relationship between Israel and its neighbor. The elements necessary to revive a two-state solution are easy to identify. On the Palestinian side, the leadership must be strong enough to negotiate authoritatively on behalf of its national community—and this will require reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The Palestinian leadership must also be convinced—and be able to convince other Palestinians—of the political and economic benefits of a two-state solution. This, in turn, necessitates not only the clear “political horizon” that the Bush administration has been pressing but also a set of short-term measures to revive Palestinian economic fortunes and social fabric. In this regard, the massive international aid program is helpful, but it is simply no substitute for an end to Israeli restrictions on the movement of people and goods. On the Israeli side, actions that undermine the two-state solution must not only be stopped but also reversed. This means a real freeze on all settlement construction, including in areas Israel claims are exempted because they have already been annexed to Israel, as well as preparations for removal of settlements that are illegal even under the permissive Israeli legal framework. Further down the line, it means that Israel will have to negotiate compensatory territorial exchanges for settled areas that will not be incorporated into a Palestinian state. Both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership, furthermore, will need to convince their respective populations that the commitments they have received through negotiations are credible and enforceable, and not subject to reversal by extremist action or by the next set of election returns. These requirements will require difficult diplomatic efforts and painful domestic choices. But what is most daunting is that pursuit of these requirements pulls in some very different directions. It may seem virtually impossible to bring Hamas and Fatah back together, while simultaneously convincing Israelis that the Palestinian commitment to a two-state solution is real. To ask that Israel ease travel restrictions on Palestinians and remove settlements would not be easy under any circumstances, but any American leadership will find it especially difficult to undertake these tasks in order to strengthen a Palestinian leadership in which the Israelis have little faith. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE